There have been requests for an elaboration on Labour’s position on internet filtering following my previous post two days ago. Here’s what I sent to Tech Liberty lobbyist Thomas Beagle in late July in response to his request about where Labour sits on censoring the internet.
In November 2008 the Labour Government introduced a programme of test filtering on a trial basis blocking access to the approximate 7000 websites, known to deal with exclusively child sexual abuse imagery.
At the time, the Hon David Cunliffe said “The programme intends to contribute to the safety of the public’s online experience by preventing inadvertent access to this type of objectionable material. It also intends to contribute to international efforts against the production of and trade in child sexual abuse imagery.
There are no plans for the programme to be expanded to other types of illegal material.”
He also stated that New Zealand had no intention of following Australia’s legislation of mandatory filtering by ISPs. New Zealand’s response to undesirable material has been an emphasis on education, as demonstrated by Netsafe. The Films, Videos and Publications Classification Act had no legislative authority for website filtering, he said.
The previous Labour Government action was in response to a proposal from ECPAT NZ, part of a global organisation which aims to eliminate child prostitution and pornography and the trafficking of children for sexual purposes.
There were clear guidelines around privacy protection. The system had been successfully trialled in Sweden.
ISPs joined the programme on a voluntary basis. Labour’s policy hasn’t changed.
I believe there is a need for further discussion within our caucus on these matters. My view is that a voluntary, opt in system for ISPs to a contained filtering programme focussed solely on child sexual abuse is about as far as you’d want to go. I’m keen to learn more about why some of you believe filters don’t work.
It’s a relief that you feel this way.
You ask to learn why some of us don’t believe filters will work, and as someone who doesn’t believe they will work I’m happy to share my opinion.
For a start, most child sexual abuse imagery is traded not over the world wide web, but rather by other protocols such as P2P communications, or more securely over anonymous, encrypted, systems such as I2P, Freenet, or on Tor .onion sites. At the less complicated level there is always things like email. These are all not targeted by the system implemented by the Department of Internal Affairs, which only works on unencrypted web pages.
Second, to bypass these filters is trivial. Using a VPN hosted outside of New Zealand is all thats required, or for the less technically minded, one can simply use one of the many free proxy sites out there which can be found with a simple Google search.
Thirdly, there has been no successful implentation of a filter system that did not end up with the secret filter list containing entries which did not deserve to be there. We are assured that filters will not go beyond child sex abuse imagery, but as shown in thing such as the United Kingdom’s optional IWF blocklist things end up being on it that really shouldn’t be, even given this assurance.
There are other reasons, such as the practicalities of administering a list of 8,000 sites, but the above 3 objections are probably the most convincing objections to the practicality of filtering, to me at-least.
I have to agree with Josh. It smells like a bit of a political stunt. If some research had been done you would know this. But at least you’re tyring……..
I agree with Josh. However, a point to make about the IWF list (which I reviewed for InternetNZ and DIA in 2005) is that it has always covered more than just child sexual abuse images. The purpose of the review at the time (http://internetnz.net.nz/issues/archive/other/INZ-IWF-CAI-report.pdf/view?searchterm=cleanfeed PDF 104Kb) was to ensure that the list *didn’t* contain stuff that shouldn’t be there, and that stuff that was there would also be not allowable under NZ law. This did not prove to be the case, as the jurisdictional differences are too wide. For example, the UK blocks hate speech, but this isn’t illgal as such in NZ. Likewise, the UK does not block bestiality images, though these are illegal in NZ. I am not aware that the current filter will block bestiality either; this will continue to be enforced by traditional methods.
Josh, have you got some links for false positives on the IWF list? I’d be interested to read them.
Disclaimer: I don’t speak for DIA on this matter, but have been approched to be part of the oversight group for the programme.
You’ve asked why some people believe that filters won’t work. I’ve posted a number of articles on that topic but in this case I’m just going to let the Department of Internal Affairs explain why they believe the filter doesn’t work that well (all quotes from DIA draft Code of Practice):
ISPs Might Not Participate
“Participation in the Digital Child Exploitation Filtering System by ISPs is therefore voluntary and this provides an effective means of ensuring that the system keeps to its stated purpose. If ISPs become uncomfortable with the direction of the system, they can withdraw.”
Doesn’t Prevent the Creation of Illegal Material and the Exploitation of Children
“The Department of Internal Affairs appreciates that website filtering is only partially effective in combating the trade in child sexual abuse images. In particular website filtering is effective only after the fact and does not prevent the creation of illegal material nor, in the case of images of child sexual abuse, the exploitation of children.”
Doesn’t Catch the People Doing It
“The system also will not remove illegal content from its location on the Internet, nor prosecute the creators or intentional consumers of this material.”
Can Easily be Circumvented
“The Department also acknowledges that website filtering systems are not 100% effective in preventing access to illegal material. A person with a reasonable level of technical skill can use tools that are freely available on the Internet to get around the filters.”
Doesn’t Stop File Sharing or Chatrooms
“As illegal material, such as child sexual abuse images, is most often traded on peer-to-peer networks or chatrooms, which will not be filtered, the Censorship Compliance Unit carries out active investigations in those spaces.”
Might Give Parents a False Sense of Security
“The Department is aware that a website filter could give parents a false sense of security regarding their children’s online experience. Filters are unable to address all online risks, such as cyber-bullying, online sexual predators, viruses, or the theft of personal information.”
All quoted material from here: http://www.dia.govt.nz/diawebsite.nsf/wpg_URL/Services-Censorship-Compliance-Digital-Child-Exploitation-Filtering-System?OpenDocument
“If ISPs become uncomfortable with the direction of the system, they can withdraw.” – And if they ARE comfortable and trhe censorship goes too far then woe is us.m
Also, shouldn’t more resources be put into shutting this stuff down at the source?
Josh is absolutely right. A net filter cannot “work”, in that working must be defined as both a) stopping traffic of child pornography and b) not stopping traffic of material which is NOT child pornography. No filter anywhere has successfully managed this balance. As I’ve said before, the DIA scheme is a good one by international standards. But I think the fundamental underlying question needs to be asked again: why do this? Why not provide free filters for families who want them – an actually voluntary scheme, unlike one where ISPs who control 94% of the NZ market will not be offering an unfiltered option? The production and trafficking of child pornography can still be prosecuted – and the sites actually removed – without using filtering.
The speed at which the internet grows shifts and changes makes it impossible to police effectively. (I wrote on this in detail in my book, and now I’m experiencing a little frustration that I can’t link to that text, or c/p it.)
The secrecy of the blacklist makes it impossible for ordinary people to know what’s being censored, a right we have with books and movies but are expected to simply give away when it comes to the internet.
I do find myself agreeing with nearly all the comments made to this point – particularly @josh @mark and @emma. InternetNZ is progressing its position on this issue very carefully.
@emma: Personally, that would be my preference as well.
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This post was mentioned on Twitter by redalertblog: New post, “Labour’s position on internet censorship” – http://ow.ly/RcW5…
@Mark Harris My reference to the IWF blacklist containing material that didn’t belong was referring to the fiasco where the blacklist contained some Wikipedia articles, in particular a page that contained some album art which had a naked child on the it. See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_Watch_Foundation_and_Wikipedia
It might not be a false positive, because it was intended to be on there, but the question is whether it should have been on there. Given that you could actually buy the album in Britain, album art and all, I think that it really shouldn’t have been on there, regardless that it was intended to be on it.
Huge agreement with Emma. Personally I think I’d opt in at the risk of losing a couple of sites which perhaps shouldn’t be on the list.
The point is this – if someone wants to trade in the material, they will look for ways around the filter. No two ways about it. Encrypted traffic is impossible to monitor and the filter does absolutely nothing to try and address these concerns with certain risks (”feature” creep – we’ve all seen it before and we’d be remiss for not wearing our foil hats on the subject).
As Josh has already stated, the material is not likely to be traded via websites anyway. It’s like the good old days before the internet when viruses were more likely to be spread via floppy disks. To share content you moved that content via floppy disks. To share illegal material, I’d imagine you’d do so in full knowledge of what it was and thus would take precautions. Such as sharing via email or chat rooms and encrypting your browsing.
It makes it impossible to stop at the point of the internet. So resources needs to go into cracking down on those doing the sharing. If you’re going to try and stop them, then do so and prosecute. Try and find out where the content is coming from and crack down on the activity – not just as a New Zealand concern, but from a world wide stand point. If the site is hosted in America, then make sure agreements are there to be able to inform authorities and get the site taken down and those responsible prosecuted.
Hell, those 7,000 sites are potentially honey pots. Leave them be, but monitor NZ ip addresses going to those sites.
I’d much rather resources were spent and the source of the material was taken down than putting a piece of tape across the entrance to the site.
“There are no plans for the programme to be expanded to other types of illegal material” – yet.
I’m strongly opposed to government censoring of the internet. Its a slippery slope all the way to China.
Emma has an excellent answer “Why not provide free filters for families who want them – an actually voluntary scheme, unlike one where ISPs who control 94% of the NZ market will not be offering an unfiltered option? The production and trafficking of child pornography can still be prosecuted – and the sites actually removed – without using filtering.“
One area I monitor is in Qatar, this timely posting of censorship makes interesting reading in another society and culture – highly relevant reading…..some quotes…(link at bottom)
“In February 2009, for example, Qtel blocked Tagged.com, a popular social networking site that ranked in Qatar’s top 10 most frequented websites.
“In this instance, because it was proving impossible to separate the legitimate from the potentially harmful, and because we saw the potential for damage – particularly to young people – we made the decision to block the site,” said Adel Al Mutawa, Qtel’s executive director for group communications.
One official at Qatar’s Supreme Council for Information and Communication Technology (ictQatar), which oversees telecom and ISP activities. …. “We’re not there to regulate the content of the Internet,” added the official, who asked for anonymity. “Qtel as an Internet service provider does provide some sort of filter. They do it for local, religious and political sensitivities.”
The Qatari constitution protects privacy, freedom of expression and freedom of the press, but it also contains a clause protecting youth from “corruption, exploitation, evils of physical, mental and spiritual neglect.”
the full article is here… Read more: http://www.qatarvisitor.com/index.php?cID=448&pID=1617
@josh: Gotcha, that was a bit of a debacle on the IWF’s part, especially as what they offer via their filter could have blanked out just the image but they chose the whole page. I agree that it should not have been so classified but, after some furore, the block was removed (http://news.zdnet.co.uk/internet/0,1000000097,39616171,00.htm), which is an indication that there is some robustness and transparency to their process.
Filters don’t work – if you don’t understand that you don’t understand the internet. The government should get the hell out and leave the web to its own devices.
Here’s a twist. They eventually got Al Capone for tax evasion. Several people here have mentioned that this material is part of an e-black-market phenomenon. That would seem to imply that they are not collecting or submitting GST to IRD, nor are they paying income tax.
If you want to get such people, leave the filters off, prosecute on tax evasion grounds as well as the other criminal grounds, and then make them forfeit all funds.
This is a lovely site in the US by a number of law schools and the Electronic Freedom Foundation.
http://chillingeffects.org/
Big topic: Digital Millenium Copyright Act (DMCA).
Physical castration of offenders, without benefit of anaesthetic.
@andrew: It’s an interesting idea and I doubt you’re the first to think of it, but it’s not the whole answer.
The first part of the problem is the international nature of the “scene” (sorry, hard to know what to call it). The people you want to go after “for tax evasion” are the producers of the material, who are generally overseas. Current wisdom is that not much commercial material is being produced in New Zealand. Some of the source countries are less effective at this form of policing (e.g. Russia, where the underground economy operates at will, and where much material that is forbidden under NZ law is quite legal under Russian law).
The second part of the problem is the trading nature, as opposed to commercial purchase. Paedophiles trade collections, rather than purchase material. There are websites which offer such material, generally by subscription, but these don’t attract the true paedophile so much as they require use of some form of commercial transaction that can be used to trace back to them. Instead, they seek out message boards to find like-minded individuals and trade images pseudonymously.
Some enforcement operations have targeted such sites and netted hundreds of people across the globe, once the books are opened, including customers in New Zealand.
Sadly, the distributed nature of the business (i.e. lots of sellers) and the low level of revenue required for profitability tend to help keep these figures out of the revenuers’ collective sight. They got Capone because all the money flowed up hill to him, so it was easier to trace and assess his total undeclared revenue, just on the basis of his physical assets. As far as we are aware, there is no “Capone” in this “industry”, just lots of “Little Augies”.
@ N, athan Mills – Agreed. LOL
@Mark: Nope, I wasn’t the first to think of attacking revenues. They got Capone that way. It isn’t a big jump to apply it to other crime.
Perhaps civil RICO would help. Triple damages for the victims. Criminal law is only half the picture.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Racketeer_Influenced_and_Corrupt_Organizations_Act
I agree that one country alone is limited, but INTERPOL has 188 member countries. It looks like their areas of interest cover cybercrime:
http://www.interpol.int/
That site is worth a browse.
@andrew: Ah, yes, I meant in the area of CAI.
First, you’ve got to find the victims.
Then you’ve got to find the perpetrators.
Then you have to determine which jurisdiction to prosecute them under.
Then you’ve got to ensure they show up (e.g. extradition)
I don’t mean to dismiss you, but you’re proposing simple solutions and international enforcement is never simple. Be careful what you wish for. (http://law.jrank.org/pages/1961/RICO-Racketeer-Influenced-Corrupt-Organizations-Act-Effects.html)
RICO works (to the limited degree that it does) because the crime is organised. The money flows in one direction, up the chain.
CAI is not that organised, as far as I can tell. I have no doubt that organised crime is involved in the production of CAI, but the distribution, dissemination and acquisition such images are decentralised and often for no cash, but like for like.
CAI is not cybercrime, any more than a bank robbery is a transportation crime, just because a vehicle and roads are used to commit the act and get away. Interpol is already involved in coordinating international efforts, which is a good thing, but it would be a mistake to load it all onto an international agency (with actually very little in resources, despite the propaganda) and surrender your own sovereigntybin the process.
We all know Australia’s govt went ballistic when it’s blocklist was published on whistleblower website WikiLeaks.
And the Internet Watch Foundation’s blocklist implemented in the UK has never been released because IWF is a private charity.
The ONLY way NZ should implement any sort of filtering is by voluntary opt-in by ISPs. If consumers don’t approve of their ISPs censorship, they are free to switch to another provider.
Every govt so far to enact censorship always keeps the blocklist secret. We should not accept NZ’s unless govt makes its blocklist public and gives spoecific reason why each and every website is on the list.
Wait a minute: Is this REALLY how we want to spend tax monies???
Actually, the IWF operates in conjunction with the UK Home Office.
But no, I agree that it is not a good use of taxpayer funds.
The State should provide both “Freedom From” and “Freedom To” – quite simply, governments should not dictate what it is that the public needs, but focus on the best long-term interests of the public – that is, to allow for better schools, health, energy, and infrastructure.
Furthermore, this kind of thing punishes the masses and the organised criminals laugh it off. Whenever there is regulation such as this, the criminals gain an advantage. I would argue that this will have no effect whatsoever on organised child-pornography rings.
Our society isn’t going to the dogs, leave us alone and we’ll raise our children the way we see fit. So be it if we have an uncensored internet, ISPs offer filtering services if we are worried about our children seeing offensive material, no need to censor the internet. Fascists…
“Are you going to make dancing illegal? Is this the tiny town from Footloose?”
I believe this has become an issue that you should be considering again now that the DIA (under the cover of darkness*) has gone live with the filter.
Here are a list of reasons why Stop the Filter believes that the DIA’s Filtering system won’t work.
http://stopthefilter.org.nz/content/why-the-filter-does-not-work
* http://techliberty.org.nz/dia-is-failing-on-openness/